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## WORLD-POLITICS.

LONDON : ST. PETERSBURG : BERLIN : WASHINGTON.

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LONDON, *April, 1905.*

DURING the past month there has been a good deal of talk in England about the Anglo-Japanese Agreement and the prospects and conditions of its renewal. The Agreement, it may be remembered, was signed in London on January 30th, 1902, came into effect immediately, and was to remain in force for five years after that date—that is to say, up to January 30th, 1907. Provision was made for its termination by twelve months' notice on either side, but this provision was modified by an agreement that if, on the date fixed for its expiration, either ally should be actually engaged in war, the Alliance should be continued until the conclusion of peace. The situation, therefore, is this: So long as the war lasts, the Agreement lasts; but, supposing the war to be then at an end, it will be open to any British Cabinet that is in office on January 30th, 1906, to notify Japan that the Agreement is to terminate a year later. The connection between this situation and the exigencies of domestic politics lies, of course, in the fact that on January 30th of next year the present Government may, and probably will, be out of power, and their place may have been taken by the Liberals, who did not frame the Agreement, who never very cordially welcomed it, and who may feel inclined to denounce it. It is these contingent possibilities that have inspired the discussion of the past few weeks and given to it, I need scarcely add, a somewhat factitious and partisan character. The Conservative journals, headed by "The Times," have demanded from the Liberal leaders a point-blank declaration of their views in the matter. But the Liberals have been in Opposition for ten years and are in Opposition now. They cannot, that is, except by hearsay, know all the facts. They have at

present absolutely no diplomatic standing, can neither make nor receive overtures on any sure and recognized basis, are debarred both from opening and from entering into the necessary *pour-parlers*, and are, besides, well within their rights and the essential proprieties of the situation in declining to commit themselves in advance on so delicate and complex a question. Most of the Liberal leaders have, therefore, met with unaccommodating silence the attempt to extract from them at this stage a definite assurance. Lord Rosebery, however, who, whether he is a leader or not, speaks on foreign affairs with more authority than any other Liberal, announced a few weeks ago that "the great probability is that, when the Alliance was to be renewed, supposing it to be renewed on terms not unfavorable to this country, the gentlemen who would then be intrusted with the government of the country would feel it their duty and honor to continue the Treaty." This declaration was really quite unnecessary. Partisanship itself cannot affect to misunderstand the sense of the country on this momentous issue. The British people have willed a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese compact as unanimously as France and the French people declared for the Dual Alliance long before it was consummated. It is a question they have taken out of the hands of officialdom and made their own; one that they have thought out on its merits and apart from any consideration of urgency; one that may be said to mark a really national introduction to the study of foreign affairs, and the beginnings of a really national policy. Just as England has revolted from the pro-German tendencies that for the last thirty years have directed, or misdirected, her foreign policy; just as she has pronounced clearly and repeatedly in favor of closer and ever closer relations with the United States and France: so she has unmistakably indicated the course that is to be followed in regard to the Agreement with Japan. There is nothing to be feared on this score from a Liberal Government. It may be taken as axiomatic that both England and Japan stand ready to renew their Alliance. The question, in that preliminary aspect of it, may be looked upon as settled.

But another and a graver question arises. The compact is to be continued—but upon what terms? It may be urged, and many do urge, that that is a point which it is altogether premature to debate at present. The conditions that will determine it have yet to come into existence. Until we know the terms of peace and

can gauge their probable effects on Far-Eastern and other politics, it is a mere speculation in assumptions even to consider the possibility of altering the terms of the present Agreement. The war, again, is not yet over, and it may conceivably drag on for a couple of years longer—by the withdrawal, for instance, of the Russian troops to the Baikal region, while a new and overwhelming fleet is being built. Moreover, there is an entire ignorance as to how far the Continental Powers may feel inclined or impelled to take a hand in the peace negotiations. Objections such as these are constantly being brought forward to shut down discussion of the conditions on which the Agreement should be renewed. Nevertheless, discussion continues; and it must, I think, be very evident to a looker-on that the way is being prepared, not merely for the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, but for its expansion—its development, in fact, into an offensive and defensive alliance that would guarantee, by the whole force of both Powers, the Asiatic possessions of each.

I may briefly indicate the arguments that are employed to recommend this far-reaching project to the British people. There are, it is said, four courses which it is possible to pursue in regard to the Anglo-Japanese Agreement. It may be denounced, it may be renewed as it stands, it may be modified, or it may be strengthened and enlarged. Nobody, as I have said, dreams of its denunciation. Both by policy and inclination, the British people are absolutely committed to continuing it. Should it, then, be renewed on its present terms? To do that, it is contended, would be to commit an anachronism. It would amount to judging Far-Eastern problems in 1905 or 1906 as though nothing had occurred since 1902 to alter them, as though there had been no war, as though the collapse of Russia were an insignificant detail, as though the situation of to-day and of the immediate future were in all respects what it was three or four years ago. The "Outlook" recently put these points as forcibly as they can be put:

"What in 1902 were contingencies to be guarded against have become in 1905, some of them actualities, others impossibilities; and calculations based on what might be have now to be revised in the light of what is. It would, for instance, be little less than meaningless for Great Britain and Japan to renew those portions of the Agreement that dealt with Corea. Corea is now in safe hands; Corea has ceased, since 1902, to be an international issue; and the references to it in the Agreement have now a merely historical interest. The very fact that a compact which

was arranged 'to maintain the *status quo* and general peace in the extreme East' has failed to maintain either, is in itself a supreme argument against renewing it on the old terms—unless, indeed, we intend its renewal to have no real meaning, and no relationship to the facts of to-day and of the immediate future, and to be rather an exchange of compliments than a serious and deliberate stroke of policy. Such, of course, is neither the British nor the Japanese intention; and no absurdity could well be greater than for the statesmanship of either country to pretend that everything is as it was in 1902, and that the greatest event in Far-Eastern history leaves the conditions and problems of the Far East sublimely unchanged."

The advocates of an offensive and defensive Alliance proceed to argue that everything which tells against the renewal of the Agreement on its old terms, tells just as strongly against its renewal in a more modified form. If, they ask, the Agreement was too weak to preserve the peace, how shall we better matters by making it weaker still? In short, they are seeking to convince the country that, when the war is over, Great Britain and Japan will have reached a point where the present Agreement between them will either have to be discarded or strengthened. They maintain that, as it stands now, it is outworn, and inapplicable to the conditions that have arisen since its negotiation; that to abridge it is virtually to nullify it; and that nothing, therefore, remains but its abandonment or its expansion. By converting it into an instrument that will bind Great Britain and Japan to go to each other's assistance, if attacked in Asia, not, as now, by two Powers, but by a single Power, they hold that both nations stand to gain. Such an Alliance, they argue, would give to Japan that final and absolute security which, for an island-kingdom, can only reside in an overwhelming naval supremacy. All, and more than all, that the Dual Alliance has been to France, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would be to Japan. So long as it existed, whatever settlement the present war may end in would have the vital assurance of permanence. To reopen it at a moment, or under conditions, unfavorable to Japan, would then become both a physical and a political impossibility, and the Mikado's subjects would be left free to husband their resources and consolidate their interests in China and Corea in undistracted tranquillity. Reasons of finance, politics and strategy combine, in short, to reinforce and commend the advantages which Japan would derive from a hard and fast alliance with the strongest naval Power in the world.

Nor, it is said, would the bargain be one-sided. Driven back from the Pacific, Russia, unless all Russian history is a lie, will infallibly seek compensation elsewhere; nor is it safe to assume that a reorganized and "liberalized" Russia will seek it less eagerly than the autocratic Russia of the present and the past. The only compensation that will permanently satisfy her ambitions lies in the direction of Constantinople or of the Persian Gulf or of the Indian frontier. Those who read, in last month's issue of this REVIEW, the masterly and comprehensive article by "Anglo-Indian" will have obtained a clear idea of the difficulties that confront Lord Kitchener and Lord Curzon on the North-west frontier. Are those difficulties likely to be increased or diminished as the result of the collapse of Russia in the Far East? Will the menace of a Russian invasion be less or greater than it was, should Russia be forced to abandon, for another decade at least, her scheme of expansion in Northern Asia? That is a question which it would require a very considerable knowledge of Russian history and of Russian internal conditions to answer at all adequately, as well as a greater hardihood in political speculation than I can plead guilty to. I therefore abstain from suggesting any answer on my own responsibility, and content myself with setting down such opinions as I have been able to gather from more or less authoritative sources. These opinions may be summarized in the general statement that, while the immediate menace is held to be less, the ultimate menace is considered greater than it was; that Russia, while undeniably weakened by the war, will recover her strength; and that, if her path is barred in the Far East, she will be all the more likely to turn her attention towards Afghanistan or the Persian Gulf. This, evidently, is the conclusion which the Government have adopted. The military estimates, which, as I write, are being debated in the House of Commons, are based upon the assumption that Great Britain must be prepared in future to provide a much larger number of troops to meet the Russian peril on the Indian frontier than were ever before contemplated. In other words, so far as the Anglo-Japanese Agreement has helped Japan to hurl Russia from the Pacific, it is just as likely that we in England, and not the Japanese, may be the chief sufferers by the recoil. The enthusiasts for the projected Alliance make the utmost of this argument. It is, indeed, the keystone of their contention. Their premises

may, of course, be disputed, but scarcely their conclusions. Once admitting that further precautions are necessary or advisable, it is all but undeniable that no precaution could be more instantaneously or more lastingly effective than an Alliance that would weld together the military prowess of Japan and the naval might of Great Britain. Such an Alliance would, in all human probability, succeed, where the palliative of the Agreement failed; it would not only keep the peace, it would irresistibly impose it.

It is far too early to say that the British people have come to any definite conclusion on this great problem; but they are turning it over, and there are not wanting signs that they are well disposed towards the bolder solution. On the other hand, I hardly think it premature to say that their minds are already made up on a correlated issue of not less complexity and moment—I mean the peace negotiations. It is perfectly clear to any one who really knows England that the temper of the country will not tolerate any attempt, on the part of European Powers, to repeat the stratagem of ten years ago and rob Japan of the fruits of her victory. Great Britain is determined, if the need arises, to stand by Japan in demanding and obtaining that security for which the Mikado went to war, and without which he will not make peace. I do not by that mean it to be understood that this country would necessarily support Japan on the indemnity question. She might or she might not; but, apart from that, she is certainly prepared to join with Japan in resisting, let us say, a proposal to convert Manchuria and Corea into neutral buffer-states under a guarantee of all the Powers, or to place the Manchurian railway under international control. If Japan decides that her future is liable to be jeopardized unless the Russians retire from Manchuria and abandon Port Arthur, Vladivostok and Saghalin, she would not rely upon Great Britain in vain for such assistance as might be necessary to prevent “third parties” from attempting to whittle down these stipulations. That, I think, may be taken as axiomatic, nor does it involve any rupture, temporary or permanent, in the admirably cordial and sympathetic relations that now exist between Great Britain and France. The Kaiser’s challenge to the Anglo-French *entente* in Morocco has merely had the result of drawing the two countries closer together. Their colonial policies have been harmonized; their European policy—the isolation, namely, of Germany—is identical; and the future may

easily convert the Anglo-French Agreement of a year ago into an instrument of a more binding and lasting character. The foreign policy of Great Britain is, indeed, at this moment singularly free, spacious and progressive. Englishmen turn to the consideration of their external affairs with relief from the round of small intrigues and mystifications to which Mr. Balfour has reduced their domestic politics.

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ST. PETERSBURG, *April, 1905.*

RUSSIA in her present condition may aptly be compared to a squirrel turning a treadwheel in a capacious cage, vigorously striking the treadle with its feet, but making no advance whatever. She cannot be said to be in a state of lethargy or quiescence; on the contrary, she displays plenty of thought and action; her nerves and muscles are brought into vigorous play, and the resulting movement is brisk and continuous. But there is no advance. She has not moved forward, is not moving forward swiftly or slowly: where she was when she first awoke from the coma of ages last summer, there she is at this present moment. It is a spectacle which may well be termed tragic: in the foreground a nation of 140 millions struggling forward with all their might towards the Promised Land; and, away in the background, a dim, shadowy figure holding them back by virtue of a mystic and almost magic power.

Every element of the population has deliberately recorded its belief that things can no longer go on as they have been and still are going on, that there must be a radical and a speedy change. After some fruitless resistance, the Tsar himself, in manifestoes and ukases, repeated these propositions in language appropriate to a ruler, and admitted that reform was an imperious necessity, a question of life or death, seeing that law had for generations been supplanted by caprice and order was being maintained by brute force. And he undertook that all this should be thoroughly remedied. Then came the further promises that to thoroughness speed should be added. But these undertakings have not yet been fulfilled. Far from that, there are good grounds for believing that no intention exists of carrying them out. In other words, the history of all struggles between kings and peoples is repeating itself in Russia, and the people can hope for nothing but what it wrests from the Tsar.



That was clearly evidenced by the last two documents which issued from the pen of the Autocrat of all the Russias. In the first of these, which was the result of a spontaneous impulse, the Emperor announces his determination to withstand the encroachment of democracy on his unlimited power. The heads of the Liberal movement are described therein as evil-minded leaders blinded by pride, "who make insolent attacks upon the Holy Orthodox Church and the lawfully established pillars of the Russian State." The people are adjured to turn from those godless spirits and rally round the throne. Feeble words, which, if they have any meaning at all, constitute a solicitation to national suicide! That document was conceived in secret and published in haste. The very ministers and official advisers, whom the Tsar had publicly charged with the task of solving the whole question of reforms, were kept in ignorance of Nicholas's intention to issue it, and they knew nothing of it until they read it in print. Nay, the law was deliberately broken in order to enable His Majesty to have it printed in the "Government Messenger." According to the statute, the manifesto ought to have been presented to the Senate before being set in type; but, by an expeditious use of the telephone, the responsible editor of the "Government Messenger" was ordered to break the law. To all his protests, the answer was returned: "It is His Majesty's desire." Considering that, no further back than last Christmas Day, His Majesty himself had expressly stated in his ukase that law was one of the pillars of Autocracy, and that he was resolved to restore its reign and suppress administrative caprice at all costs, it is natural that this illegal act should have caused a painful impression and produced a demoralizing effect. For the responsible editor had to be publicly reprimanded and privately thanked.

But the manifesto was itself as reprehensible as the manner in which it was promulgated. That was, at least, the opinion of the ministers, who resolved among themselves to oppose force to cunning, and to oblige Nicholas II to undo by means of a second document the mischief which he had produced by the first. It was a unique combination, and, six months ago, it would have caused the dismissal and disgrace, and probably the banishment from St. Petersburg, of the insolent dignitaries. But Nicholas II, taken by surprise, had to sign the rescript, drawn up by M. Witte long before, and in this way to condemn in the evening the doctrines

which he had preached in the morning. It was the first public humiliation which any Tsar ever yet endured.

But Nicholas II was not put out by that rebuff. He had his view adopted by the Holy Orthodox Church and his manifesto read from all the altars throughout the Empire. The manifesto, but not the rescript. The rescript which announces the Tsar's resolve to convene the worthiest men "possessing the confidence of the people, and elected by them to participate in the elaboration and consideration of legislative measures," was tabooed. Priests and pastors were silent about it, monarchist journals ignored it and the police would have suppressed it as they had suppressed the imperial ukase of December in some parts of the Empire because it was a concession to the Liberals. "The Emperor ought not to have written such things," a censor once said to a journalist who wished to reproduce a speech of Alexander II. And the comments of the priests on the unctuous manifesto were mischievous. In that document, the Tsar reminded all authorities of their duties and their service-oath, and called upon them "to display increased solicitude in the safeguarding of law, order and security." These words were construed by priests and police as an exhortation to spread and intensify coercion. And this was a virtual declaration of war between ruler and ruled. Since then, the police has carried out the supposed recommendation, and contemporary Russian history is made up of the results. On the one hand, the guardians of order, including the Church officials, endeavor by every means, licit and illicit, to stem the popular current which threatens to sweep away Autocracy; and, on the other hand, the Russian people strives, by dint, now of peaceful agitation, now of violent acts, to intimidate a group which it can neither persuade nor convince. Hence, newspapers are suppressed; educated citizens are being put in prison; public lectures are being forbidden; doctors, lawyers, engineers are threatened with severe penalties if they meet in congress; physicians must not concert measures against the cholera; detectives and Cossacks drive the audience out of theatres, surround schools, attack prisoners, search private dwellings and, in many respects, treat the people as a conquered race. And the people are not behindhand in confronting force with force: revolutionary leaflets, anti-governmental journals, strikes, associations, plots, political assassinations and agrarian riots are some of the forms of opposition resorted to by the nation.

Class has been incited against class, nationality embittered against nationality by the police acting in the supposed interests of the Autocracy. The clergy, too, as mere officials, seconded the efforts of the detectives, and in the name of the Deity egged on one element of the population against another. The "intellectuals"—they assured their flocks—had been bribed by Japan and England to rebel against the Tsar and ought, therefore, to be suppressed without ruth. They deserve the fate of Judas or worse. And in some cases the congregations, whose passions were thoroughly roused, went straight from the church to the schools and attacked them. The priests who thus made mischief were not rural clergymen only; in many cases, they were responsible clerics who ought to have known better. The Rector of the Ecclesiastical Seminary of Minsk, for example, likened to the devil all subjects of the Tsar who desired a legislative assembly. They were tempting, he said, the Lord's Anointed, as the Evil One had tempted Jesus Christ. Nicholas II must have regarded it in the same light; for, after having yielded to the temptation, he repented. In Saratoff, money was offered by agents of the police to the scum of the populace by way of inducing them to fall foul of students. In Pskoff, the guardians of public order hired ruffians for a quarter of a dollar to beat the intellectuals, and then paid them only fifteen cents. They went still further: for, disguising themselves as doorkeepers, roughs and tramps, they themselves took a very active part in the fray. In St. Petersburg, the Superintendent of Police summoned all the doorkeepers of the houses in his ward, and offered them prize-money of from one to two dollars for "taking by the scruff of the neck and dragging in here to me every one who talks about the Government, and every one who looks suspicious." To be a student or a scholar, or to belong to the intelligent classes, is now a crime. To talk about the Government is treason.

What befalls the people who get into the clutches of the police is often worse than what happened to them when Plehve was all-powerful. If they escape with a thorough beating, they may consider themselves not unlucky: in a few cases they are said to disappear altogether.

Nor is it only in provincial towns that this flagrant breach of law has been raised to the level of a system by the "Tsar's brigade," as the police has been called. In St. Petersburg and Mos-

cow, the practice is the same. A few days ago, a lady walking along one of the thoroughfares of St. Petersburg saw a woman gazing now at one, now at another, of the passers-by with an imploring look, as though she desired, yet feared, to confide her troubles to them. The lady then asked whether anything had gone wrong with her; whereupon she fell a-sobbing, and for a time could make no reply. Finally, she said: "My husband . . . is gone. He was a workman. . . . in the Putiloff Works here. . . . Several days ago, he was sent for by the police, and he went to the station. . . . Since then he has not come back. And I am alone now. . . . I mean not alone. . . . I have two children in arms, but there is no one to work for them." Asked what her husband had done, she could give no answer. She only knew that he had never been accused of any offence. She wanted to find out whether he would be tried or set free or banished. But her desire was vain. "Police violence is in vogue in Samara," writes one of the principal newspapers of Russia; "the police is addicted to pummelling at all times in the streets and in the torture-cells of the temporary gaol. . . . Murders, robberies, larcenies, assaults by roughs are daily occurrences. And the police is either unable or unwilling to discover the perpetrators; nay, it refuses to protect the victims during the attacks."

How the Tsar's friends can permit the monarch thus to forfeit the affection and esteem of his subjects who still entertain these sentiments towards him, is an enigma. But they go further: they encourage an innovation which even Plehve never ventured to introduce. Law was formerly restricted or abolished by high dignitaries or such imperial institutions as the Council of Ministers. Now it is being circumscribed or repealed by the police. On the 3rd of March last, Nicholas II bestowed upon his people the right of forwarding petitions to the Government respecting imperial needs. This right he conferred upon individuals and institutions. Sixteen days later, the principal men of letters in Russia agreed to meet and draw up a petition to the Government. But the police forbade the meeting; and, when the authors pointed to the Tsar's ukase, the Prefect answered: "I am empowered to interpret that document as bestowing the right of petition upon private persons *singly*, but it does not authorize several persons to meet and discuss."

The other concessions of Nicholas II are being construed in a

similar restrictive fashion. The labor commission which he created under the chairmanship of Senator Shidloffsky was dissolved, because the Government, having ordered the workmen to choose representatives, refused to guarantee the elected spokesmen immunity from arrest. The commission which he appointed to consider the advisability of freeing the press from restrictions still sits regularly in one building, while in another, not far away, newspapers are being gagged, correct information being suppressed and misleading data circulated.

That is why scant faith is expressed or felt by the Tsar's subjects in his promise of a legislative assembly. People hold that Nicholas II is generous of promises and chary of fulfilment. The historic rescript of March 3rd was to usher in a new era. The people and the Autocracy were to draw near to each other, the wolf to dwell with the lamb, and the bureaucracy, which served as a partition separating monarch and people, was to be cut down. In reality, the hand of the bureaucracy has been made stronger than before, the press has been effectively muzzled, law has been superseded by police caprice and the last state of Russia is much worse than the first. If any hopes had been entertained that the Minister of the Interior would make reasonable haste and embody the concession in a working institution, it has been dispelled by the Government communication of the last day of March. That hazy document deprives the Special Commission which was to have organized a legislative assembly of the right of fulfilling its destination. It transfers that right to the Council of Ministers—a subservient body under the presidency of Nicholas II—and puts off practical measures to St. Tibb's Eve.

Such are the tactics of the Government: systematized cunning and organized force employed without regard to consequences. And congruously with those tactics the methods of the people were regulated. At first, timid requests, humble petitions, respectful remonstrances. These, being soon forbidden, were succeeded by passive resistance in the form of strikes. And after the massacre of unarmed people by the troops, Russia entered upon the last stage: force combined with fanaticism and ruse. At present, obnoxious officers, civil servants and police officials are being shot at sight, just as dangerous characters used to be "potted" by the gold-diggers of the Wild West. And the men who execute them, sure of public approbation, are seldom caught red-handed, and

hardly ever traced later on. A bullet in lieu of a leading article, a bomb instead of a humble petition. And the authorities are literally powerless. Nobody now asks their authorization, few heed their prohibitions. The people throughout Russia proper, as in the Caucasus, is become a law unto itself. What, a short time ago, would have been a treasonable conspiracy is now a national strike, for what the authorities were powerless to hinder they have condescended to approve—*post factum*.

It was thus that professors and students struck work throughout the Empire, resolving not to resume occupation before September. The Minister of Public Instruction—a military man of modest cultural acquirements—threatened to punish them with the utmost severity of the law. To no purpose. Then Majesty bestirred itself. The Tsar ordered the Minister to inform the professors that it was his will they should return to their lecture-rooms without more ado, and, at the same time, he bade the Committee of Ministers to give the matter their early and earnest consideration. Of punishments, he added, they were not to be chary, in case argument should prove ineffectual. But Witte, the grim President, demurred. The University question, he said, was but an aspect of the Russian problem, and should not be dealt with apart from that. Meanwhile, the professors in European and Asiatic Russia again deliberated and again refused to yield. The Ministry might refuse to pay them their salary or might punish them, as it would, but they would not be false to their convictions. Then the Government yielded.

And now a feeling of solidarity is growing up among all the literate subjects of the Tsar. The liberal professions are banded together as one man. All the engineers of Russia form a league, which has been vainly prohibited by the police. The lawyers are preparing to form an association of their own, with ramifications all over the Tsardom. The professors of Universities and High Schools are about to organize themselves into a corporate body, with a president, a council and a fund, to demand academic autonomy and liberty of teaching. The doctors, who have just met together in congress to concert measures against the cholera, have declared that the common people have been rendered rebellious to medical advice, in consequence of the legend inculcated by the clergy and the police that the educated classes have been bribed by the Japanese and British. Therefore, to help the people

against the cholera, their confidence must first be won back, and that can be done only by the press, which ought to be freed from all irksome restrictions. Even the Zemstvos are agitating for a central club. In a few months, therefore, the intelligent classes will be leagued together against ignorance and oppression.

But, meanwhile, the illiterate masses, the workmen and the peasants, may rise; nay, according to all trustworthy forecasts, will rise in May—and this time to strike a serious blow. The operatives, who are not wholly unorganized, know exactly what they want, and understand why they failed to obtain it last January. Hence in May they mean to use force against force. Rifles and revolvers, even, if they could procure them, would make but a poor show against quick-firing guns; therefore, they are determined, it is said, to carry hand-bombs, called “tangerines” because they are no bigger than small oranges. It is a resolution fraught with calamitous results, moral as well as physical, to the whole Russian people. Never before has a revolution been carried on with the help of such destructive engines, and it may well be doubted whether ever before the ethical principles of a nation underwent such a serious modification as is involved in the frank approval of political assassination. A general strike, then, and a series of dynamite outrages are the programme for May.

What the peasantry will do is included in no programme, predicted in no forecast. They are one of the incalculable forces of the revolution. Almost indifferent to political privileges, they are eager to obtain possession of the land. The long-fostered notion that it is theirs by right is now a settled conviction, for which, when they come together in bands, they are willing to fight like heroes or die like martyrs. Already, they have laid waste vast estates, looted manors and country houses, and burned sugar refineries to the ground in eleven States or Governments. Competent authorities on the subject affirm that in Spring the movement will spread with elemental force. In some places, the tillers of the soil announce that they will not allow the land-owners to sow their fields in Spring. In several districts, they have cut down the timber belonging to the squires, carted away their corn, taken and sold their hay. In a few villages of the Government of Chernigoff, they are said to have used “tangerines.” In the Baltic provinces, they have upset all order and reduced the administration of the rural districts to a chaotic

welter. Landowners are fleeing to the cities. Troops are being despatched to the villages: gendarmes have been attacked and defeated by armed bands in the south.

All this might have been hindered a few months ago. It might still be moderated to-day, if there were a statesman in power capable of uttering the magic word. But Witte is under a black cloud. Nicholas II is his own statesman and Russia must endure her fate. He holds that the Autocracy is indispensable to Russia, just as Russian domination in the Pacific is indispensable to the world. In order that he may be right, all Russia must be wrong in one case, and the whole world in the other.

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BERLIN, *April, 1905.*

ONCE more the eyes of Europe are focussed on the German Emperor, who after a period of comparative retirement has reappeared, with dramatic suddenness, in the foreground of World-Politics. The scene of his reappearance was Tangier, which he visited on March 31st with the object of proclaiming that Morocco—in defiance of Anglo-French Declarations and Hispano-French Secret Conventions—must remain “a free and independent country.” In order properly to appreciate the sensational action of the German sovereign, it is necessary to recall for a few moments some of the events of the past year, beginning with the month of April, when the Anglo-French understanding was first made public. Incredible as it may appear, it is yet a fact that the German Government steadfastly refused, until the last moment, to believe in the possibility of such an understanding. It pinned its faith resolutely to the Bismarckian maxim of the irreconcilableness of Anglo-French interests, as represented by Egypt, on the one hand, and Tunis and Morocco, on the other. On that maxim was first constructed the theory of German foreign policy, which was to distract France from her “hypnotic preoccupation” with the “hole in the Vosges,” by creating interests and enemies for her elsewhere. By inciting France to seize Tunis, Bismarck, as he more than once boasted, designed to place a permanent strain on her relations with Italy, in the same way as he hoped, by encouraging the British occupation of Egypt, to erect an insuperable barrier between Great Britain and France. For many years, events justified the German calculations. Italy was fettered to the Triple Alliance by her apprehensions for the future of



Tripoli, which is menaced from Tunis, while Great Britain was bound to Italy by the tie of mutual antagonism to France. The Fashoda incident shed a flood of light on the Teutonic standpoint. It brought Great Britain and France to the brink of war; and, amid the din of the conflict, the voice of Germany could be plainly heard exhorting France to note that Great Britain was, after all, the only "hereditary enemy." France appreciated the message at its true worth, settled her quarrel with Great Britain, and, under the sagacious guidance of M. Delcassé, set to work to balk the German tactics. She negotiated an understanding with Italy, whose right of preemption to the Turkish province of Tripoli she confirmed, in exchange for Italy's recognition of the preeminence of French interests in Morocco. Germany, though her stake in Morocco was considerable, did not for the moment take alarm. She gazed indulgently on her Italian partner's "extra dance," as Count von Bülow styled it, and exultantly rubbed her hands in the thought that the Southern Pillar of Hercules would now prove a fatal source of discord between Paris and London. But, in the mean time, Anglo-German antagonism, fed by the South-African War, had assumed formidable proportions, and in the soil of common hostility to Germany were sown the seeds of the Anglo-French understanding. Germany was not quite blind to the growth of affairs, but she relied on the Far-Eastern War to devastate the diplomatic harvest which the British and French Governments were bent on gathering. She was convinced that, as long as that war lasted, harmony between the allies of the belligerents was an impossibility. And it was in this conviction that the German Emperor started last year on his Mediterranean cruise. He visited Spain and Italy, but, to his chagrin, encountered the influence of France in both countries. He passed on to Malta, and amused himself by inspecting the British naval forces at that station. He had already telegraphed his congratulations to King Edward on their efficiency, when the announcement reached him that the Anglo-French Agreement was perfect. The Emperor was dumfounded. Vainly he sought for consolation in the text of the Agreement, which was forwarded to him with all possible speed: its contents shattered his most cherished theories of the Balance of Power, and brought him face to face with the phantom of German isolation. To allay that phantom, he planned a chance meeting with President Loubet, who was then on his way

to visit the Emperor's Italian "ally." But, though the "Hohenzollern" hovered about the coast for several days, it failed to gain a glimpse of the Presidential yacht, which had purposely given it a wide berth. In a mood of intense irritation, the Kaiser cut short his tour, and hurriedly returned to the Fatherland; for he was by this time convinced that a gigantic anti-German plot was in process of being hatched, and that the diplomacy of France was establishing a coalition which would be capable, not only of ignoring Germany's interests in Morocco, but also of countering her policy in Europe and Asia Minor. He gave vent to his anxieties in a series of explosive speeches, which he delivered close to the French border. At Karlsruhe he eloquently invoked the memories of Wörth, Weissenburg and Sedan. "I hope," he said, "that our peace will not be disturbed, but the events which are now agitating the world seem designed to admonish us . . . to steel our courage, and clear our eyes in view of the necessity, which may be imposed upon us, of intervening in the politics of the world." In his oration at Mayence he was even more explicit. After alluding again to the prospects of a breach of the European peace, he dwelt on the strategic value of the new bridge over the Rhine, which he had that morning opened to traffic. He was sure, he said, that the bridge would stand Germany in good stead, should she ever be obliged to pass her columns across it. These sombre utterances were vigorously exploited by the Pan-German orators. Germany, these political freebooters exclaimed, had an indefeasible right to a naval port on the Atlantic coast of Morocco; and, if the Sultanate was to be divided, she must also claim a strip of territory adapted to the purposes of colonization. To achieve these ends, Germany must defy France and, in the Imperial phrase, promptly "intervene in the politics of the world." As usual, the Emperor's eloquence had been misunderstood. He was far from advocating offensive diplomatic operations at that juncture. Imbued with the idea that he was isolated, he had, indeed, decided upon a waiting policy. But, in order that the nation might appreciate his attitude, he caused to be widely circulated throughout the Empire a symbolical illustration of the situation. In that picture, which forthwith decorated the shop-windows of the Capital, the Kaiser was depicted, in pilot's uniform, at the helm of the good ship "Deutsches Reich." Around the stout vessel a terrible hurricane was raging; the waves were of engulfing

volume; but, in the look of alert determination which marked the features of the pilot, lay the assurance that the storm would be safely weathered.

The waiting policy endured for nearly a year. In the interval, France had propounded the doctrine of "pacific penetration." She had assumed responsibility, in the eyes of the majority of nations, for the maintenance of order in the Sultanate. With Spain she had concluded a Secret Convention, providing, so it is supposed, for the division of Morocco into spheres of influence, with Tangier and Tetuan as the Spanish share, at the end of thirty years. And to Fez the Republic had despatched a special Ambassador, charged with the task of securing assent to a root and branch scheme of reforms. The Sultan, however, tenacious of his power, expressed invincible objections to the improvements urged upon him by the French. The Ambassador grew impatient, and ended by informing the young monarch that he was the mandatory of Europe, which required the prompt acceptance of its proposals. The Sultan, who, like others of his race, is gifted with a keen scent for dissension, ran without delay to the German Consul and inquired if the Emperor had authorized the French Ambassador to speak in his name. The answer, of course, was in the negative. A telegram was forthwith despatched by the Consul to Berlin, containing the gist of the French scheme, which was designed to secure the appointment of French agents to control the finances and administer the customs of the Sultanate. These measures were deemed in the German Capital to infringe upon the principle of the "open door," and it was decided to punish the *faux pas* committed by the French diplomatist. Had the incident occurred a few months previously, it is highly probable that the German Government would have remained quiescent; for it was then in the throes of a war panic, fostered by the insane belief that Great Britain and France were planning a combined attack on Germany. But the statesmen on the Spree had recovered somewhat from their alarms, and were becoming increasingly sensitive to the inconvenience of M. Delcassé's diplomacy, which, in Turkey as in Morocco, was strictly hostile to the interests of Germany. They planned a demonstration. The Kaiser, it was announced, had made arrangements to visit Tangier in the course of his Mediterranean tour. Some days elapsed before the true significance of this announcement was grasped in Paris. For this,

perhaps, the main responsibility must be laid at the door of the Emperor, who, on the eve of his departure from the Fatherland, delivered an oration on his most recent conception of World-Politics.

To judge from his utterances on that occasion, William II was in anything but an aggressive mood. Instead of speaking, as usual, in terms of "mailed fists" and "eagle's talons," he dwelt, in a spirit of religious fervor, on the vanity of aiming at territorial expansion. With the spectacle of the Russian downfall before his eyes, he informed his hearers that he had sworn a solemn oath never to strive for the Suzerainty of the world. Alexander the Great, Napoleon the First and other heroes of military history, he observed, had deluged the earth in blood in their pursuit of universal dominion: the World-Empire, of which he, the German Emperor, dreamed, would, however, be based not on the conquests of the sword, but on the confidence of other nations in its neighborly love of peace, its integrity and sense of justice. Though interesting psychologically, on account of its Cæsarian conceptions, the speech could scarcely be considered effective when regarded as the prelude to diplomatic action. Count von Bülow, in the hope of correcting the somewhat lame impression created by the Imperial utterances, fell into the opposite extreme. He dictated to the newspapers a semi-official note of a highly polemical character.

In that note, he accused the French Foreign Minister of having deliberately ignored the German Empire in his treatment of the Moroccan question. To this day, he observed, the Berlin Foreign Office was officially ignorant of the contents of the Anglo-French Declaration; but there was still time, he hinted, for the French Minister to correct his omission before the Emperor arrived at Tangier. To this hint M. Delcassé replied with the assertion, made through the Paris press, that, so far as he was aware, there was a German Embassy in the French Capital, and that, if Count von Bülow desired to obtain any information from him, he could do so by employing the Ambassador for the purpose. For the rest, he affirmed that he had given Prince Radolin, the German Ambassador, the most ample assurances on the subject of the Moroccan Declaration, as early as the Spring of 1904, and that the Chancellor had himself taken cognizance of the Declaration in his Reichstag speeches. Count von Bülow rejoined that he

could not regard as binding the assurances of a Foreign Minister, vaguely made in casual conversation with an Ambassador; and that the German Government, in the absence of explicit statements from Paris, intended to guard its interests by means of direct negotiations with the Sultan of Morocco, who was an independent sovereign. The controversy was continued with acrimony, and was only prevented from assuming a perilous character by the fiction, which was preserved on both sides, that it was merely an affair of newspapers. Finally, Prince Radolin left the French Capital ostensibly on a holiday; but the real object of his departure, so the German journals explained, was to relieve Germany, in the eyes of the Sultan, of even the suspicion of a desire to arrive at a separate understanding with France regarding Morocco.

The Emperor reached Tangier on March 31st. He was received with operatic honors. The uncle of the Sultan welcomed him as the political savior of Morocco; and Raissuli, the Brigand Chief-tain and Head Kidnapper of European and American millionaires, was equally effusive.

But the operatic character of the reception accorded to him failed to divest the day of its political significance. To the Sultan's uncle, as to the German colony of traders, the Emperor observed that he regarded Morocco as a "free and independent country." It was essential, he added, that all nations should enjoy equal rights within its borders, and that no one nation should be allowed to establish a predominant influence over its development. Can, will, the Emperor make good these words? By uttering them at a critical juncture in the negotiations at Fez, he has, beyond all doubt, disturbed in a most disagreeable manner the progress of French ambitions. He has excited the fanaticism of the tribes against the reform scheme, against all innovations; he has encouraged the Sultan to reject definitely the overtures of the French Ambassador. But it is doubtful if he has accomplished anything more. Morocco is not Turkey, where, by currying favor with the monarch, the Germans have managed to gain considerable advantages over their commercial rivals. Morocco is a land divided against itself, held together solely by its hatred of Western influences. Any day the Sultan may be swept away by the forces of insurrection, and Anarchy will reign, if possible, still more supreme. The French will then be compelled to intervene.

Their task will be one of endless difficulty, but the German Emperor will be powerless, except at the expense of war, to obstruct them. For the promotion of foreign trade, it is essential that Morocco shall be forced along the path of progress and civilization. No country, save France, is in a position to exercise the pressure requisite for this operation. Great Britain, whose commercial stake in the Sultanate is sevenfold that of Germany, admitted this feature of the situation by intrusting France with the preservation of order in Morocco. Spain and Italy imitated her example. Germany, after seeming to acquiesce in the new order of things, suddenly arrested the hand of France. By so doing she has unquestionably revenged herself on a statesman whom she considers her deadly enemy, and has secured for herself an ephemeral prestige in the Mohammedan world. But the national passions she has aroused she is incapable of quelling; and, if her former actions supply any criterion of her future line of conduct, she will desert the Moors, as she did the Boers, in the hour of their fate. For the Emperor has no intention of making war on France, or of sacrificing the bones of his Pommeranian Grenadiers on the altar of Moroccan trade. His policy is purely spectacular.

For more than a year the Kaiser has been led, by an exaggerated idea of the dangers besetting him, to suppress his histrionic desire to figure on the stage of World-Politics. But, as soon as his forebodings proved to be groundless, he yielded to the temptation to afford the nations a display of his power. Germany has been but poorly served by his action. She has gained nothing from it that she might not have secured by independent negotiation with France, who was prepared, if asked, to furnish her with the most absolute guarantee to keep open the Moroccan door. But the Emperor chose to quarrel with M. Delcassé on what, after all, is only an obscure point of diplomatic etiquette; and, in endeavoring to teach that statesman a lesson in manners, he has affronted the French nation in a manner which will not readily be forgotten. For France has been quick to note that the Emperor delayed embarrassing her until the Battle of Mukden had completed the paralysis of the Dual Alliance: and from that observation the deduction is irresistible that she must seek another ally against the policy of Germany.

WASHINGTON, April, 1905.

THE topics of general interest most discussed in the Federal capital during the current month have been the position taken by the United States with reference to Morocco; the actual and prospective attitude of the State Department toward the Caracas Government; and the likelihood of the Senate's acceding at the first session of the Fifty-ninth Congress to the proposal embodied in the Esch-Townsend bill passed by the House of Representatives, and known to have met with the approval of the President—the proposal, namely, to give the Interstate Commerce Commission power to change railway rates under certain circumstances.

There is a widespread impression that Judge Taft, who is not only Secretary of War, but, during the absence of Mr. Roosevelt, is invested with control of the State Department, evinced insight, foresight and tact in dealing with the plausible suggestion made by Emperor William II that the United States should join with Germany in insisting upon the permanent maintenance of the "Open Door" in Morocco, and to that end should guarantee the permanent independence and territorial integrity of the Shereefian monarchy, without regard to any agreement, possibly inconsistent with such independence, that may have been concluded between France, Great Britain, Spain and Italy. The specious argument is believed to have been put forward on behalf of the proposal that the Washington Government could not, with any show of logic and consistency, decline to pursue in Northwest Africa the policy to which it has repeatedly committed itself in China. The text of the agreement entered into between the British and French Foreign Offices with reference to Morocco has not been published; but it is alleged that the signatories only bind themselves to maintain an open door in that country for thirty years; and that, irrespectively of such avowed limitation, the nature of the tutelary functions delegated to France is irreconcilable with the permanent retention of any genuine independence by His Shereefian Majesty, but must inevitably tend to reduce him to a position analogous to that which is at present occupied by the Khedive of Egypt. That is probably true: at all events, it is universally believed. If, however,—so Emperor William's representative might conclude his argument—four Powers are at liberty to form a compact which, by implication or by practical results, would tend eventually to deprive other na-

tions of equal commercial privileges in Morocco, why should not the same or other four Powers pursue a similar course in the Far East, to the ultimate detriment of the United States? Would it not be consistent, therefore, for our State Department to object to the establishment of a possibly mischievous precedent in Morocco, and concur with Germany in requesting that the agreement concluded between Great Britain, France, Italy and Spain should be submitted for approval, modification or rejection to a Conference or Congress of all the Powers commercially interested in Northwest Africa?

To this ingenious but sophistical presentation of the German Emperor's plan, Secretary Taft is understood to have virtually replied that it is not a statesman's business to be logical and consistent where his country's interests happen to conflict with logic and consistency. He is believed to have pointed out that we have not now, and have not reason to expect, much commercial intercourse with Morocco; and that, consequently, we have no motive for renouncing our traditional avoidance of European entanglements; and that, therefore, while we should continue to favor the "Open Door" in China, with which Empire our actual and prospective commerce is large, we must decline to take part in any move with reference to Morocco which would be likely to antagonize our friends in the London and Paris Foreign Offices. The effect of the judicious and cautious position taken by Secretary Taft is already obvious. We hear no more of Germany's suggestion that a Conference should be called for the purpose of reviewing the English-French agreement to which Spain and Italy acceded; and there is no longer any doubt that France will proceed to exercise the delegated function of maintaining order and assuring administrative reform in the Shereefian dominions.

By well-informed persons it is now taken for granted that, for the present, at all events, our State Department has no intention of resorting to force to compel the Caracas Government to withdraw the case against the New York and Bermudez Asphalt Company from the Venezuelan court before which it is pending, and to refer it to arbitration. Whether the demand made by Minister Bowen for such a reference was really of a threatening tenor is not definitely known; neither has the text of President Castro's reply been published. It is reported, however, that the Caracas Executive expressed respectfully a desire to learn whether



our Government could seriously mean to impugn the integrity of Venezuelan tribunals. It is alleged that President Castro went on to argue that, if no such intention existed, our Government could hardly expect him to withdraw a case from the jurisdiction of his country's courts, and thus by implication impeach their trustworthiness. It is tolerably certain that, for the moment, at all events, we are not ready to express officially the conviction—shared, though it is said to be, by most of the foreign merchants residing in Venezuela—that the courts of that country cannot be trusted to dispense justice. Such a declaration on our part would, no doubt, be echoed promptly by European Powers; and the deduction would be drawn that Venezuela must be forthwith relegated to the semi-independent position of those countries—Egypt is an example—where disputes to which a foreigner is a party must be settled, not by the native tribunals, but by consular courts. It is plain enough that not without a desperate fight would Venezuela submit to the imposition of that régime of extraterritoriality against which Japan so long and earnestly protested and from which she has recently emerged. It is equally clear that in her resistance she would have the hearty sympathy, if not also the active assistance, of all the Latin-American commonwealths, who, in the fate with which she was menaced, would foresee their own. We should, in a word, have to undertake a war of conquest in Venezuela, and at the same time incur the lasting suspicion and hatred of all Latin-America. For what? In order to safeguard the property of the New York and Bermudez Asphalt Company from possible confiscation at the hands of the Caracas Government, under a judicial decree of the highest Venezuelan court.

Before we embark on such an undertaking, it might be at least prudent to inquire whether the Asphalt Company, bearing in mind the legal axiom, *caveat emptor*, did not enter with eyes wide open into its contract with the Caracas Government; whether it did not covenant, when it obtained a concession, not to appeal from the judgment of the highest Venezuelan tribunal; and whether it be not very doubtful if it could come with clean hands before a court of arbitrators. Touching the last-named inquiry, we may, without presuming to prejudge any particular case as to which the high court at Caracas has not yet rendered a final decision, point out the grounds on which the property of the Asphalt Com-

pany has been placed temporarily in the hands of a sequestrator, together with the answer made by the defendant corporation. It appears that the Bermudez Asphalt Company is accused by the Castro Administration of having abetted the recent revolution, of which General M. A. Matos was the recognized leader, by paying to the revolutionary leaders, who for a time held sway in the State of Bermudez, all the dues which it had contracted to pay to the Caracas Government. It is also alleged to have forfeited its franchise by its failure to canalize certain rivers, a work which it is said to have been bound to perform by the terms of its concessions. To the first charge the company demurred, on the ground that, under the Venezuelan Constitution, no financial claim for damages incurred during a revolution can be made after a restoration of peace. By the court of first instance this demurrer was overruled, on the ground that a state of war still exists in Venezuela, President Castro's proclamation of martial law not having been revoked when the present action was begun. As to the alleged forfeiture of its franchise by breach of contract, the company maintains that it was not bound to canalize the rivers named in the concession, because such canalization had not been expressly confirmed by the Venezuelan Congress. This claim was also set aside by the court of first instance, for the reason that, as the concession had been confirmed under a general act of Congress authorizing similar grants, no specific confirmation of any stipulation was required.

As regards another American case which has been the subject of negotiation between our State Department and the Caracas Government—the so-called “Olcott claim”—it is undisputed that this, by agreement of the respective countries, has already been submitted to arbitration, and our only ground for requesting a resubmission of the case is that the American claimant is dissatisfied with the judgment rendered by the arbitrator. It is not likely that the Roosevelt Administration would use the military and naval forces of the United States for the purpose of compelling President Castro to rearbitrate a case which has been already arbitrated. On the whole, we opine that Venezuela is in no immediate danger of coercion at the hands of the United States.

It is even less probable that France will interpose to protect from confiscation by the Venezuelan courts the property of the French Cable Company. The French Company is alleged to

have violated the terms of the concession by which it received from Venezuela a monopoly, because, instead of laying a continuous ocean cable to New York, it covered part of the distance by a land line across Santo Domingo, where the wires have repeatedly been cut by revolutionists. It is also asserted that, during the late rebellion against the Castro Administration, officials of the Cable Company assisted Matos and his friends in two ways: first, by handling their business secretly, and, secondly, by giving them copies of all the Government cables, so that the plans of their opponents were made known to them. It is said that documentary evidence in support of these charges was found on the persons of captured rebel officers. The French Company, on its part, denies the charges, and goes on to contend that, even if they could be sustained, no arbitrator would give judgment for such heavy damages as would amount practically to a confiscation of the property, whereas just such a judgment is expected from the Venezuela tribunal. It is generally believed that the monopoly given to the French Cable Company was secured by bribery, for which reason the corporation would, doubtless, very much prefer to see its case settled by diplomacy rather than by subjection to judicial investigation. Nobody believes that the French Government would intervene to protect by force the interests of the Cable Company, so long as the United States shall refrain from a similar proceeding on behalf of the Bermudez Asphalt Corporation.

It will be remembered that the Senate adjourned without acting upon the Esch-Townsend bill, although the House of Representatives had approved the measure by a majority closely approaching to unanimity. The coterie which is popularly known as the "steering committee" of the Republican majority of the Upper Chamber of the Federal Legislature were of the opinion, we were told, that careful investigation and mature deliberation should precede the bestowal upon the Interstate Commerce Commission of the power to change railway rates even provisionally. To the end that such inquiry should be made, a committee was empowered to sit during the summer, and acquire adequate information on which to base a report to the Senate on the convening of the Fifty-ninth Congress, an event which, it is expected, will take place early in October, the President being credited with the intention of convoking the Federal Legislature in a

special session. The composition of the committee would not augur well for a report favorable to the Esch-Townsend bill, if the Republican leaders in the Senate had any hope of arraying the majority of their party's spokesmen in the House of Representatives against Mr. Roosevelt. That, however, they know to be impossible. The members of the next House, having been returned at the same time when the voters recorded their confidence in the President, are keenly alive to the fact that their election was due in a large measure to the Roosevelt tidal wave, and are even more likely to cooperate with the Chief Magistrate than were the members of the last House, who were chosen in 1902, when it was doubtful whether the accidental occupant of the White House would receive the next Republican nomination for the Presidency. The truth, of course, is that every wide-awake member of the Senatorial Committee must be conscious that he is—to use the slang of the day—"up against it." Especially is it true of Mr. Elkins, whose influence in the committee will be second to none, that he was never known voluntarily to butt his head against a stone wall, but, on the contrary, has been wont, with instinctive astuteness, to follow the line of least resistance. That line does not point to overt conflict with the White House. The prevailing opinion, therefore, is that the kind of enlightenment which the Senatorial Committee will receive during the summer should be described as egoistic rather than altruistic, and that its clients, the railways, will be discreetly informed by its report that, while it would gladly further their interests if it could, it has arrived at the conclusion that self-preservation is the first law of nature. We shall not, therefore, be surprised if, shortly after the assembling of the Fifty-ninth Congress, the Senate should approve a measure substantially identical in its vital provisions with the Esch-Townsend bill.